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WILLIAM & MARY DARLING: MEMORIAL LIBEARY UNIVERSITY OF PITTSSURG

# CONDUCT

OF A

### NOBLE COMMANDER

IN

# AMERICA,

Impartially reviewed.

WITH

The genuine Causes of the Discontents at NEW-YORK and HALLIFAX.

AND

The true Occcasion of the Delays in that important Expedition.

#### INCLUDING

A regular Account of all the Proceedings and Incidents in the Order of Time wherein they happened.

The SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:
Printed for R. BALDWIN, in Pater-noster-Row.
M DCC LVIII.



#### THE

# CONDUCT

OFTHE

## Earl of LOUDON.

Writer, not long fince, dropped, some ambiguous words, which might be understood to reflect upon lord Loudon; and the whole nation was alarmed: it was an infult upon the wifest meafures; and an abuse of one of the first of men. Power in a little time changed hands; and the peoples voice changed with it: fluctuating and weak as water; and driven, like that, any way, by the least breath of artful men. Nothing was now expected, where all before seemed certain of success; and wagers were offered by those who affected to be in the secrets of government; that the rest of the world might form the designed opinions.

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The measures were still the same; and the man the same who was to conduct them; and if he had not deserved the first extravagant applause, far less did he merit the new obloquy. The design was as likely to succeed under one administration as another, for the force to execute it was unaltered; and neither the old nor new ministry had any share in its contrivance. The plan was his alone who stood entrusted with the execution of it; and there neither was nor is any cause to doubt, but he would have pursued the true path to its success.

He is now returned: and in the place of that glory which he would probably have gained; he has the unfair reprefentations of interested men to combat; and hears his conduct arraigned by those who have as little knowledge of the circumstances,

as of the nature of the service.

This his lordship has passed hitherto, and I suppose will continue to pass over, unregarded. The good and great are above the notice of popular clamour: but what themselves despise, others often feel for them. I think the earl of Loudon would be as much above answering such accusations, as deserving them: but they are so easily resuded, that it were much to be regretted if none should do it.

The general opinion of these persons is, (at least it is their general exclamation) that his lordship did not sufficiently push the service; and that Louisbourg might have been taken with the force under his command. They are bold enough also to urge the measures of government in changing the command, as a circumstance of proof for their affertion.

It little becomes such persons to judge of the resolutions of a ministry, which it is impossible they should understand; and it would be as improper for me to question their propriety, who am as far from any knowledge of their motives; but it will be easy to shew, this nobleman deserved no cenfure; and it must then be indifferent from whom it comes.

If it shall appear by the following fair detail of circumstances, that the earl of Loudon laid a plan of operations, equally for the glory and interest of his country; that this defign received the fanction of the government; and himself, its author, had the honour of the command; that the meafures by which he purfued this purpose were conformable to reason, and the nature of the fervice; and that they were approved by those most immediately concerned; that the expedition was pushed with all possible vigour by his lordship; and was rendered impracticable by accidents in which he had no B 2 concern:

concern; we have reason to hope the candid and honest will continue to pay that regard to his lordship's great qualities, with which they received the notice of his being appointed to

command in that enterprize.

This we shall attempt to snew, by a plain recital of facts; which will be related, we hope with accuracy; at least with impartiality: for we have no view but truth. This has been hitherto obscured by artifices, or defaced by rancour, but it is not difficult to clear off those stains, and present the fair relation to the world. It has not yet been done, and indeed, according to the circumstances, could not easily; for we have depended in England upon the representations of things from those on the spot, who, though they knew the truth, were partial.

The people of New York hated lord Loudon for two things; his quartering the troops upon them, and the embargo on their ships: and power changed hands in England. The enterprize miscarried, as half the enterprizes in the world have done, from the circumsances of things, not from any fault in the commanders: and though we suffer, no one is to blame. This is the general state of the case; and this will appear by the fol-

lowing facts.

We shall take in the whole time from the first plan of the enterprize, to the return of the troops; and we have neither defire nor power to misrepresent them. They have been laid before the publick as they occurred, and occafionally, in large recitals: and we may apply to every account that has been published from the articles of news-papers, to the syftems of the temporary politicians, that they are as here represented, and that they never have been represented otherwise. These being allowed, the reasonings cannot be contradicted, for they flow from no other fource; and we flatter ourselves the impartial publick (to whose judgment kings appeal) will entertain no doubt in any circumstance. What is here offered is the plain and uninfluenced voice of reason: if his lordship had been confulted, doubtless it would have been better; but it is thus difinterested; and I believe no one will have so much cause as himself to be diffatisfied.

The story will stand as an example of the vanity of the

## Arbitrium popularis auræ.

And if the reader wishes to see another, let him remember the poor good old lord Blakeney. The vehemence of applause, and the sudden and unmerited turn from it to censure or neglect, are miserable instances of B 3 the

the unsteadiness of the human mind; and while they teach us caution, they should be

also lessons of humility.

Toward the latter end of the year before last, the earl of Loudon laid before the ministry his sense of the state of the war. The importance of North America needed not to be infifted on; it was too obvious for argument: the little fuccess of our forces there, he shewed, was owing to their having undertaken little; and it was proposed to attempt Cape Breton, and thence all Canada. The enterprize was great, and it was therefore fit for Britons. The thought was worthy of a heroe; and with the proposition, this nobleman laid down the means and measures for its execution: vast as it appeared, he shewed it was practicable; and we have no reason to doubt but that he would have proved it so in the execution. Perhaps we shall still see it done with the same forces, and upon the same plan: and I think I may venture to fay, that in this case no man will be more rejoiced at his country's fuccess than lord Loudon, or more indifferent whether it were brought about by himfelf or by another.

When this nobleman proposed to the government an enterprize against these places, he delivered in an account of the force which might be required for its execution;

and the greatest persons in the kingdom, after a mature consideration, did equal honour to his lordship's head and heart, by approving not the purpose only, but the plan of operations; and by committing to his care the conduct of the expedition. Lord Loudon received the approbation of his scheme with the same coolness wherewith he had laid it; and, with an undisturbed mind, planned the necessary measures, not of success alone in the enterprize, but of safety in the colonies which might be exposed by it.

Three points demanded great confideration. The preventing the enemy from receiving intelligence of his defigns; the providing an uninterrupted transportation for the troops; and the securing the frontiers of the several colonies, most exposed to be attacked by the enemy, while the main force was acting effectually on the great

scheme.

These are the requisites to a rational undertaking of such importance, and without these success would either be impossible; or the consequences worse than its failure.

For these lord Loudon provided by a timely care, and by such measures as appeared to him the most easy and effectual.

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Had things at home continued in the flate wherein he left them, these measures would have been applauded, as they certainly appear to have deferved; and every one of them would have been a new article in his praise: but men judged differently by the time the accounts arrived: and the mob who had before applauded not without reason, though without knowledge, were now taught to censure and condemn equally without either; and they who knew a little

against both.

Men who were at this vast distance were to judge of operations, without knowing upon what circum@ances he who was on the spot found them necessary; and they who were ignorant of the nature of command, were to determine concerning the measures of the war. The politician of a coffee-house was to sit in judgement upon his defigns, whom the government had underflood to be perfectly capable of the fervice; and it may be faid with that freedom which becomes the truth, ignorance was not his most dangerous enemy. Men were taught to fay what those who influenced them knew to be false; and the reputation of the commander was to be facrificed, while he was pursuing a design approved by his country, by those very measures which he had laid down for its execution.

I shall

I shall not anticipate by entering into particulars what may be necessary on a more important occasion; but I shall add, there are some who will blush to read this; and

perhaps fear what may follow.

As to the popular opinion, no man defpifes that, except he who knows he does not deferve it; but I may add, I think, with truth, that this commander, though perhaps he has felt with as much warmth of gratitude as any man the applauses of his country, yet would disclaim them upon the conditions on which some have tried

to gain them.

The measures by which this general provided for the execution of his enterprize, and the defence of the colonies, though they be now controverted, were once approved: they still are what they were, and it seems plain to reason they would have been approved still, if any other man had followed them. He was in a command that authorized his taking these steps; and he was upon the spot to know, though we are not, that they were necessary. This will appear hereaster; and it is just it should be believed now, unless some reasonable cause be shewn to doubt it.

In the colonies, the governors whom his lordship assembled on that occasion, entered into all his reasons, approved all his propofitions, fitions, and, like the government at home, adopted all his measures; and by their ready

concurrence did him peculiar honour.

They were pleased to think he underflood the state of their respective governments better than they did themselves; and while they acknowledged the wisdom of placing them only on the defensive, they were at once surprized at the easy means by which he proposed to effect it; and perfectly convinced that those means were sufficient.

When in pursuance of his lordship's plan, the number of troops to be supplied by each colony was settled, and the places of their destination were appointed, according to the well laid and well understood plan of general desence; this part of the preparation was accomplished: and the respect the several governors paid to the commander, and the unanimity they shewed among one another, gave every possible prospect of tranquillity.

Thus far the enemies of lord Loudon (but I recall the term, he can have none) let me be permitted to call them the blind and mifguided creatures of those who wish him ill, must acknowledge every thing was

conducted well.

The two remaining articles, the effectual conveyance of the forces, and the preferving fecrecy in regard to the enemy, were to be provided

provided for, one way and only one: this was by laying an embargo on the outward-bound veffels. Either of these occasions would have justified that measure in the eye of reason, but both concurred to demand it. This expedient answered both purposes, and no other measure could have answered either.

I know this embargo has been an occasion of much complaint at home, for some cause of diffatisfaction must be affigned; and this was best, for it was popular. Far be it from those who interest themselves in lord Loudon's cause to endeavour to deny, to extenuate, or even to excuse this proceeding. If there be blame laid on it, what is the cause? was it not necesfary to the service? none would dispute it, that would be too hardy: it would betray an ignorance no man would charge upon himself. Had he not a right and just authority to do it? there is no question but he had. His orders were absolute: he was supposed to understand the service; he was considered as a brave and an honest man; and he will be confidered as fuch a one when even the detestation shall cease, which will long pursue their memories who now affect to think him otherwise.

It must be owned that the laying an embargo on the outward bound vessels was a necessary measure, and that lord Loudon had just authority thority to do it. Of what then is it that men would complain! Is there any one will fay a commander is to blame, who does a necessary action by his proper power? there is none so absurd! Let them on the other hand say, whether they would not have blamed him if he had omitted it? They would have had just reason.

This emburgo was attended with many inconveniencies to private persons: it is allowed; but it could not be avoided. Publick measures of the most useful kind often are so, and when the people's voice is left to its free course, the necessity is seen, and there

is no complaint.

None will dispute the necessity of it in this instance. It is impossible. At the same time it must be owned, it was attended with particular inconveniencies. England was in want of corn; at least the publick by bad men were made to think so; and to suffer as much as if the scarcity was real: there was corn in the colonies that could be spared; and the embargo prevented for the time its exportation. The circumstances are certain. But did lord Loudon create these circumstances? was he the author of our imaginary samine, or in the plan of his enterprize could he foresee it?

It is allowed those persons in the colonies who had shipped corn for England lost an advantage: but it was a loss that could not be avoided: and if those who have been loudest in complaints would make out a fair-list of the sufferers, the quantity shipped, and the time delay'd, it would be found that very little occasions, when it is thought convenient, can raise great clamours. This is the fair way of stating the account: it is very plain why they will not be brought to do it; but if we hear more of it, 'tis not impossible that we may do it for them.

In plain truth the inconvenience was much less than has been pretended; and the importance of the measure greater than can be well imagined. The candid reader sees the fair state of the case; and he will perhaps say for himself, what, after the measures that have been taken, it would be indecent for me to

fay to him.

The government has, in consequence of the clamours on this subject, taken from commanders, for the future, the power of extending an embargo to ships destined hither from the colonies. I shall not take upon me to judge whether this step be wise, or what were its immediate motives; for I think greatly of their integrity and wisdom who now have power: but if it be thought by any that this new regulation restects disgrace upon lord Loudon, they may be told that on the contrary, the taking away this power for the future.

future, acknowledges he had it justly when he exerted it; and the necessity of the service was really enough to have answered

much greater private disadvantages.

Men, whose own hearts had taught them to seek bad motives for the conduct of others, laboured to attribute this embargo to a different cause: and there were not wanting some weak enough to imagine, or wicked enough to pretend they imagined there, that this step was taken to savour the bargains of those who were to provide for the forces: nor did we want here men who were impolitick enough, I had like to have said absurd enough, to adopt the opinion.

I shall not enlarge here upon the private character of lord Loudon; but they must have known very little of it, who could suppose him capable of being influenced by such motives; and they must have surely strange heads as well as most abandoned hearts, who when the nature of the publick service so plainly and so needfully required this measure, could attribute it to private views and

personal interest.

Those who were upon the spot can acquaint the incredulous, that it was not till late in the clamour, that this accusation was started. The first complaints were of the hardships of the measure; the unhappy state of private men who must be oppressed to

ferve the publick; and the necessities of England. These were the first exposulations; but when lord Loudon steadily opposed the publick cause to these private hardships; and though he was concerned to see them, would not endanger the general service to remove them; then it was that private purposes were pretended; then malice taught the sufferers to invent causes, which themselves did not believe; and these were added to the former clamours.

Lord Loudon, in the consciousness of his own innocence, stemmed this torrent of calumny there; but probably he did not imagine it ever could be received in England.

If it be a crime to prefer the publick fervice to the conveniencies of a few private perfons, it cannot be denied that lord Loudon has been guilty. If the care of those forces, which are expected to perform the greatest exploits, be criminal in their commander, this nobleman is without excuse. He had before this great affair of the embargo, incurred the ill will of some individuals on this account: and it must be owned, that he seems on that first occasion to have considered the soldiery not only as valuable members of a state, but as human creatures. These are his crimes: for he is not accused of others, except by perfons who are too low for answering; and to all these I believe he will plead guilty. England

land had refused to give quarters to the Heffians, whom she had called over for her immediate defence, at a season when the field presented only death to them: and New-York, faithful to the disgraceful example of the mother country, would have exposed to death with as little remorse the troops this government sent thither for her protection; and for the enterprise designed by this commander.

On this occasion, if reason be allowed to judge, lord Loudon's conduct may be set as a model for all future officers in the like circumstance.

The troops the government had fent in pursuance of the plan, arriv'd after the worst hardships of a winter's voyage: and after all their sufferings, they had the spirit to say, that they complained of nothing, since they knew

the fervice required it.

The people, though they had been fenfible enough of these dangers, and though they looked upon their troops as destined for their lasting security, yet would have treated them with a rigour disgraceful, even if shewn toward the prisoners of an enemy: the publick houses were by no means sufficient for their reception; and to the most mild remonstrances, the magistracy answered, with as little decency as feeling, that they should not be admitted into private ones. The commander knew

knew equally his power, and the necessity of the fervice: he ordered them in a fair and equal distribution to the private as well as publick houses. The magistracy insisted on their rights and privileges; to which lord Loudon opposed his authority, and the neceffity of the fervice. They were outrageous, and he was refolute. He always spoke with great respect of their natural and political rights; but he would not facrifice to them the lives of the foldiers. His lordship carried his point; and he then took orders for the good behaviour of the foldiers. In this he was as indefatigable, as he had been resolute in giving them quarters; and it will be owned at New-York for ever, in spite even of prejudice itself, that the soldiers behaved with fo perfect regularity and decency, that those who had been loudest in the opposition, owned afterwards they suffered no hardship.

Let us now fairly review these two capital incidents. It was on these the commander first lost the good will of some people in the colonies; and these as soon as they sound encouragement from England, spread the most

unjust aspersions:

Lord Loudon had the honour to be entrusted with the conduct of a very important enterprize; and he manifested a due care and a becoming spirit in providing in these two instances for the preservation of the troops,

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and for preventing that common fource of disappointment in English enterprizes, the intelligence of the enemy. In each of these cases some private persons suffered inconveniencies: and there are mouths in which a little hardship will make a loud complaint. It is enough to fay, that the disadvantages in each case were the least that could be expected; and that, with a determined care for the fuccess of the enterprise, all possible attention was shewn to the interest of the people. The embargo was continued no longer than the necessity of the service required: and the people fuffered nothing from receiving their deliverers into their houses. Perhaps they saved all by it. The schemes and purposes of the enemy for that year's campaign are now known; and their disappointment was owing folely to these succours: fo that it is not too much to fay, that the numbers of these forces, and the determined spirit of the commander in chief, which the French also knew, faved these colonies without striking a blow. If they knew what it is for a country to be the feat of war, they will at length understand what are those services of a force which deters the enemy from attacking them: and they will know, what those who are fit to command armies always know, that much more fervice may in fuch cases be done by keeping the

the forces together, than even by the gaining

a victory.

Whether or not this has been the case in that quarter of the world, let those speak who have been upon the fpot at the time: others talk as they are influenced, often wickedly and always ignorantly. It is probable, that we shall now speedily receive the news of victories and acquifitions there; but it will be allowed, that the operations of the preceeding campaign have laid the foundation of them, and led the way to them: and no man will have the presumption to fay, that equal advantages would not have followed, if the command had continued in the fame hands. For my own part, and I am not altogether unacquainted with the circumstances, I think certainly they would: and when I recollect the fury of applause and good opinion, which accompanied this nobleman on his undertaking the fervice; and fee no step by which he has justly forfeited that good opinion, or deferved even the lightest censure, I cannot join the multitude in disclaiming my first sentiments: but rather pity the weakness of human nature, and blush to see men of greater abilities carried with the torrent, and adopting opinions which they could not defend.

It was an article of high importance in the regulation of this enterprize, that a fleet of

confiderable force should sail from England at such a season as to join its influence in the action. The commander in chief of the sorces knew very well at what time this sleet ought to sail from England; and when it might reasonably be expected in America. His lordship computed the voyage, as accurately as such circumstances will admit of computations; for a voyage to America is always longer than one from thence to England: and allowing for this and for the chance of winds, he computed that they might be

expected the first week in June.

Let me demand, with that fair freedom which becomes the truth, can any man fay lord Loudon judged amiss in this respect? was it not reasonable that he should expect the fleet at that time; or was it reasonable he should undertake without them an enterprize of fo great moment, and in which they were destined to have so large a share. Plain as the answers to these questions are, the demand is not the less necessary. What I have heard objected to the conduct of this nobleman, has arisen either from want of knowledge of the most plain facts; or from a resolution to conceal that knowledge. The answer to all the cavils is so plain, a man of reason is almost ashamed to make it: but they should blush who have rendered it neceffary.

Much

Much more might be faid; and may be if farther occasion calls; but, for the fatisfaction of the difinterested publick, this will be sufficient.

We have feen the state of the enterprize, its dependance upon a fleet from England; and the regular expectation of that reinforcement. Let us review the conduct of lord Loudon, even to the minutest article; for what is honourable will bear it, and be more itself, the stricter is the trial. It will rise as gold from the furnace, the more pure

and perfect for these strict enquiries.

The troops who had arrived in the depth of winter, had been recruited and refreshed by three months rest and sood in their quarters; when the preparation was to be begun for the service. These quarters and this refreshment we have shewn they owed to lord Loudon: the people would have lest them in the streets to perish. The spirit and determined resolution with which, though under the softest language, his lordship had insisted on this point against the magistracy and people, doubtless have made him many enemies there; but they ought to have procured him more friends here; and to have endeared him for ever to the army.

It was plain those people would endeavour to misrepresent his actions; but their source of enmity, which continued not the less

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violent though concealed, should have been always confidered here; and their accounts judged accordingly. The transports became the next confideration; and it was computed, that about ninety would be fufficient for the embarkation. Timely care was taken of this: the government was not put to a needless expence, by keeping them in pay a long while before they were wanted; nor was the preparation left to the last moment. As it was possible the fleet from England might arrive fooner than the computation, ninety vessels for this service were ready by the first week in May, and were got together at New-York, with orders to be in readiness to receive the forces. This was the conduct of the general; and let me ask those who would find fault throughout his proceedings, what in this was wrong, what was ill-judged, or what they would wish otherwife? 'tis thus we have defired them to examine the whole conduct of the enterprize, and thus we shall defire they will continue the examination. That these things are true as they are here represented, is notorious: and how could they have been directed better?

Lord Loudon held all things thus in readiness a fortnight, waiting with that impatience which could not but arise in the breast of a commander who loved his coun-

try,

try, and had concerted measures for rendering her the most important service, for the

arrival of the fleet from England.

Though toward the end of May they were not arrived; as every day brought the utmost limits of the computation nearer and nearer, the forces were in the last week of that month ordered to embark.

This was done with good order and due expedition. They arrived at Sandyhook on the first day of June; and on the fifth of that month, the time of utmost computation for the arrival of the English sleet, lord Loudon also embarked, that he might be in readiness to fail on its arrival.

Hitherto let us ask partiality itself, was there any fault in the conduct of lord Loudon, or could there any be pretended in it? is it not evident that his force was ready and himself ready, to act on the arrival of the fleet; and would they have had him fail without them?

While the preparations were making at New-York for our troops embarking, news came that the French had a fquadron of fome force cruifing off Halifax: that they were fix thips of war, five of them of the line; and that they were deftined to Louisbourg. The intelligence, which came express from Boston, was confirmed by the crews of some prizes which had fallen into the hands of the priva-

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teers of New-York; their testimony relating to the number and force of the ships concurring with the account from our own

people.

The fleet from England eagerly expected was not yet arrived. What was the commander of the land-forces to do? could he with his transports and the small support of ships of war that attended them, proceed against such a force? there is none so rash or ignorant as to say it.

All that could be done was done: two ships of war were fent out to view the coast;

the transports remaining at anchor.

The year was now advanced toward the latter end of June: and the feason of the campaign, in which so much was to be done, became contracted into very narrow limits. Lord Loudon, who had formed the plan; and from his knowledge of all circumstances, had so great expectations from it, passed the hours employed in this necessary step in great impatience: at length these ships returned; and had seen nothing of the enemy.

The operations of the campaign, the hope of advantage to England from all this preparation, hung now almost upon a point of

time: a moment.

To fail was not without hazard; but to delay longer was to give up all. If fuch a force

force of the enemy, as had been represented, should have fallen in with the transports, the event must have been dreadful; but there was hope they might not, since these ships fent out on purpose had not seen them.

Lord Loudon, urged by this prospect of success, and by the certain mischief of a longer delay, sailed on the twentieth of June; and he arrived in ten days at Hallifax.

Perfect in the expectation of the English fleet's coming, lord Loudon, who had waited hour by hour while he lay at Sandyhook for its appearance, never doubted, but in the time of hissailing from thence to Hallisax they would arrive: but even this thought was vain. He made the dangerous voyage successfully; but he found no fleet, nor had

the least notice of any.

Delays in England, and contrary winds in the passage, kept admiral Holbourn from North-America till the second week in July. I do not know that there is any accusation fairly to be laid against those who were expected to prevent the delay at home; and certainly the winds are uncontroulable: but whatsoever prevented this sleet from arriving at the expected time in America, prevented also the successful execution of the project. The present fleet has sailed under more happy auspices: it has reached the destination more than two months earlier than that did which should

should have supported the operations of lord Loudon; and as we judge with reason that the delay of that fleet prevented our success, we may with equal justice promise ourselves that glory from the present expedition, which it was impossible to reap in the other.

Lord Loudon found at Hallifax the deftined reinforcement of thips and men; and he landed his foldiers, and encamped them

on an advantageous ground.

All this time the eagerly expected fleet was absent. His lordship kept the men employed in clearing ground for a parade, and afterwards in regularly exercising them upon it, and in making every other preparation that could be necessary or useful in the

fucceeding time of action.

At last the fleet arrived; not in a body, but ship by ship, as the winds and seas permitted. July was wasting fast; and every motion required now the most pressing haste. The first step toward the attack of Louisburg was to learn the state of the place at that instant, the force and condition of the enemy, and the several circumstances which might give light into the best method of attack.

Veffels had from time to time been fent out to this purpose; and now some of the best failing ones in the fleet, with the most experienced pilots on board, were dispatched

with

with the two great instructions, a careful ex-

amination, and a quick return.

In the mean time, the care lay in preparing the land force for the attack. The number amounted to about eleven thousand; but a great part of these were new to the profession of arms, and ignorant of the

duty.

The first business had been to give them the rudiments of their instruction on their landing at Hallifax; and they were now practised in the methods of attack; and accustomed to the smell of powder, by repeated representations of regular sleges; in which every incident that could occur in actual service was shewn them; and all those things which might have thrown them into confusion in the assault, by their novelty, were rendered familiar by the examples, conducted with the most perfect regularity in these exercises.

This was the employment of the land force, while intelligence was fought by the ships: and by this the men were so well taught their duty, and so familiar with every article in the attack of an enemy, that perhaps from a body, in great part raw and undisciplined, they were, by the end of that short interval, such as it would be difficult to equal in many armies.

It does not appear to me, that a better use could have been made of the time necesfarily employed in gaining intelligence: nor can it appear to any, that Louisbourg should have been attacked before this information was obtained. There is no man fo lost to reafon. Yet this is by some strange artifice, and by a more strange conduct in the generality, attributed to the commander in chief as a crime; and he is thought blameable for it. This also gave occasion to the gallant impatience of an officer in high command; which I yet think deserved applause not censure; much less the harsh steps which a council of war thought proper to take upon that occaffon.

He who blames eagerness in the troops, condemns what he ought of all things to encourage and applaud. The earnest valour of the officers is of the same true stamp, and of the same high character; the regulations of the service will always prevent its going too great a length, and it is a good presage of success in action.

These are to wish for the engagement, but it is the commander in chief who is to determine when to enter upon it. His valour should be of another cast and character, tempered with cool thought, and under the

absolute controul of reason.

He alone is to determine when and in what manner to attack the enemy: his place and office give him this authority; and the first praise in those who are under him in command, is acquiescence in his opinions,

with unanimity.

The repeated exercises and constant employment of the troops in these attacks, had raised in them a spirit of earnest desire to enter on the real fervice; and it is no wonder their officers breath'd the same generous ardour. I think it may be faid within the bounds of modest truth, that no man in the army defired the opportunity of entering upon action more earnestly than lord Loudon; but in him it was a defire tempered with a thousand cautions. The lives of the men, the fuccess of the enterprize, the glory of his country, and her immediate and most important interests, depended solely upon him: he must answer it to God and to his country, if all was not conducted rightly, and the least overfight of his might cost the lives of the men, and the very hope of the cause.

For these reasons he earnestly sought the necessary intelligence; and certainly the management and employment of the force while he waited for it, (however some men, in whose minds raillery takes the place of reason, may have represented it) was the

most rational that could have been devised.

The foldiers thought fo; and they found the effects of it in fuch an improvement, as was never made in a like body of troops in equal time: the people also thought it who were on the spot. It was an act of which every man could judge; and all voices were una-

nimous in approving it.

If it could be charged upon lord Loudon that he protracted the time of waiting for this intelligence, and that he had omitted fuch means of it as were before in his power, there would be just ground for this censure: but it is notorious that was not the case. Our attempts for intelligence were unhappily delayed and disappointed; but these mischances in the execution cannot lay blame upon the commander who gave the orders. This and this only is the question with relation to his lordship; did he or did he not dispatch vessels at proper times, and with proper instructions on this important service? It is most evident that he did: and this was all he could do. We can no more charge upon lord Loudon the ill luck of those he sent out for this purpose, than the delay of the English fleet.

It is certain that such a fleet, the force and destination of which were settled so

long before, might have arrived in North America at a much earlier period; and in that case the time necessary for gaining intelligence would not have swallowed up the feafon fit for action; but it is not lord Loudon's fault the fleet from England came fo much too late. He could do no more than get in readiness to act with it when it should arrive; and he was in that readiness. time of gaining intelligence between the arrival of the fleet, and the entering upon action, must be allowed as a necessary period of delay, by all who weigh the action. This could not be retrenched by lord Loudon; the only question, which can regard his lordship's conduct is, whether he prolonged it. Let this be examined strictly, for it will be to his advantage every article should be fo fcrutinized; but let us fet out justly, The time was prolonged beyond all expectation; but lord Loudon no more prolonged it, than he delayed the fleet.

It is allowed, intelligence was necessary from time to time, and most effential of all before the entering upon action. Lord Loudon had from time to time fought and obtained it, and just before the engaging in the service, he dispatched swift failing vessels, and good pilots to obtain it, and to make a speedy return. Some time must elapse in this employment; and during this time,

his lordship exercised and accustomed the forces to the intended service. This was not censured: far otherwise; it was applauded. But the time of waiting was protracted, and when the intelligence was slow, he was censured as if he had been the cause; and the employment of the troops in mock sights and counterfeit attacks was condemned and ridiculed even by those who had before applauded it. So light is human nature.

If this employment of the foldiers was reasonable at first; it could not be ridiculous afterwards: if it was once right; it could not become wrong, unless by wasting useful time upon it. But the time could not be useful till the intelligence arrived; and the censure was therefore most unfair. commander in chief ordered these exercises for the inftruction and improvement of the foldiery, in a time of inaction: this inaction was necessary, while the intelligence was fought, and it could not but continue till the intelligence arrived. There could be no better or more useful employment of the foldiers during that period, and it was not continued any longer.

One almost blushes to state propositions which are in themselves so clear, so largely, but there is no other way to combat the popular clamour. They who have been so rash as to censure this commander,

either do not understand these things, tho' they are so plain; or they affect not to see them clearly. It is necessary therefore to state them as they are; either to convince those persons, or to shew the publick that

they act against conviction.

With regard to the delay itself, now let the impartial hear the reasons. The very day the commander in chief came to Hallifax, the most experienced pilot of the place, captain Goram, was fingled out for the important fervice of gaining intelligence of the enemy's strength and condition. His orders were express, and they implied diligent enquiry, and a quick return. He found in the harbour of Louisbourg fourteen ships of war; ten of the line, the others frigates: this was the condition of the enemy before the arrival of the British fleet: and I suppose the most severe accuser of this general's conduct will allow, all that he could do was to gain intelligence of it. There is none who would have had him enter on the attack against this force, and without the fleet.

The time of waiting for the English ships was so considerable, that great alterations in the state of the enemy's affairs might have been made in that period: therefore fresh-knowledge of their strength was afterwards necessary. Captain Rous was then sent out

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in the Success, and two vessels of less force, with one of the transports, the best failor among them. Intelligence from this source was of the highest importance, and the design was excellent for obtaining it. The transport was to be sent as close into the mouth of the harbour as possible, that the French might take her for a prize: this would naturally have brought out a pilot, and they were to have come back with him, to the general and commander of the fleet.

If this failed, and he should be chased by the ships of war, the orders were for the ships in the offing to get between the enemy and land, and take up any vessel they should see, that the people might be examined for

the necessary intelligence.

The commander in chief can have no more to answer for, than this plan of service, and these orders. We know the plan was not executed, and the orders were not punctually followed; but this lies not at his door: nor indeed at any man's. There seemed a better opportunity of intelligence to offer, and the pursuit of that prevented the other. All that regards lord Loudon, is the propriety of this design for gaining it; and that we may presume none will attempt to blame; it is certain none there blamed it; and they were better judges than any can be here.

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That the commander in chief was fully determined to attack the French, upon the state of evidence first brought in by captain Goram, none pretend to doubt, nor can it be said that any necessary or proper measure tending to that purpose was omitted. The arrival of the sleet was to give the means of the attack; and all that could be done now,

was to have every thing in readiness.

After this all was conducted in the same manner: and the last day of July all the transports were order'd in divisions to the west shore, and to have the boats ready for receiving the troops; a proper number of men draughted from the Hallisax regiments were sent on board the men of war; and the whole force had orders to be ready for embarking at an hour's notice. The next day all the troops were embarked, councils were held for the immediate conduct of the enterprize, and a sloop of war was dispatched to England with intelligence of all that had passed.

The Success, whose captain had the command of the ships sent out for intelligencea full fortnight before, thought he had sallenin with readier means than those contrived for this purpose: two vessels came in fight as he sailed toward Louisbourg, which by all marks and characters appeared to be a privateer schooner of the enemy, with a fri-

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gate of Louisbourg. The captain put himfelf in such position, that they could not scape him; and while he pursued them, dispatched the transport back to acquaint the governor what fortune had thrown into his way.

When he came up with these vessels, his hopes of information vanished: he had the misfortune to find, that all his zeal and earnestness for the service had only served to lead him into an error. The vessels were an

English privateer with a prize.

What added to this ill fortune was, that the transport being gone, it was impossible for him to execute the first intended plan. He sought by every means to repair the mischance, and succeeded so far, as to take a fishing vessel newly come from Louisbourg, which he carried into Hallifax.

The intelligence these people gave, strengthned the resolution of immediately attacking the place, and gave that spirit and eager expectation to the forces which rise from certainty of success. They confirmed in every instance the truth of captain Gorom's first account, as to the state of things at the time when he gave it; and they represented them in a yet fairer light for our enterprise at present. The account the people obtained from this intelligence was, that of the source ships of war seen there by captain

captain Goram, one half were fent to Canada: the enemy not having penetrated into the fecret of our purposes; nor knowing where we destined the attack. The garrison of Louisbourg, they added, was not more than three thousand men.

All now conspired to animate and encourage the troops; and every measure was taken for the immediate execution of the great design: the forces were embarked, the vessels ready, and Gaberon bay near the harbour of Louisbourg was appointed as the

rendezvous in case of separation.

I suppose it will be allowed, that the attacking or not attacking Louisbourg must have been in reason determined by the force there: what our own strength was we perfectly know; and upon the intelligence now stated, there was fair reason to promise ourselves success. Under these circumstances the attack was resolved; and under these it would have been executed: but other intelligence arrived the next day but one; and necessarily occasioned other measures.

Captain Goram, fent out a fecond time, was not yet returned; and early, on the fourth of August, a French prize was brought in: she had been fent from Louisbourg, and was bound to France; her business was to carry intelligence, and she was taken, with her papers.

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These gave a certain and a true account: a spy might be deceived; but those who wrote home an account of the state and strength of the place must know it. This was certain intelligence, the rest was conjecture. By this it appeared, that there were then in the harbour of Louisbourg twenty-nine ships of war, seventeen of them of the line, the rest frigates; and that the sorces amounted to sour thousand regulars, beside the garrison of three thousand before-mentioned.

This changed the face of affairs absolutely, and, with it, changed the measures of the commander. As certain as it had been that we might attempt Louisbourg with great hopes of success, according to the former accounts; so plain it was that we now could not.

The firength of the enemy rendered the taking of the place impracticable; and the general has been blamed, who therefore declined the undertaking.

This is the fair, and this the true state of the noble commander's conduct: and this will, with the impartial, set asside all censure. If we may credit the accounts since that time, this state of the place contained in the French papers must have been true, and in that case it would have been rashness unbecoming a

general, and unjustifiable in the highest de-

gree, to have made the attempt.

It appears that lord Loudon, from this and other concurrent testimonies, sound the place too well supported to be attacked with his force; and he therefore gave up the design for that year: leaving the glory of this important conquest to some succeeding and more favourable opportunity. He took back the forces; distributed them in advantageous stations; and was preparing for other enterprizes, when it pleased the government to

give the command to another.

These are the facts relating to that undertaking: they are plain, certain, and notorious: there is nothing new to the reader in this state of them, for those who have before from time to time recorded them, have done it justly. From these the arguments are easy, and the conclusion is certain; that lord Loudon has acted according to the power entrusted to him, like a brave and wife man: and that the state of things determined him to defer that enterprize, in which there is no prospect he could have succeeded; to times in which it may perhaps be accomplished by another. Though whenever it is done, the publick will find, that even with more force, and more advantages, the struggle will be desperate.

If we would learn how ill reports first rose concerning the commander; and why a man almost adored one year, became the object of unfair censure in another, the cause is easy; and they know little of human nature who cannot trace it, without our assistance. Our opinion of men and actions in that remote part of the world, cannot but be influenced greatly by the sentiments of those upon the spot; whom we suppose to have more opportunities of knowing, and whose testimony we are too apt to receive, without considering the influence of their passions.

The opinions of people in England concerning lord Loudon have been greatly influenced by those of the inhabitants of New York: perhaps it may be fair to say, they have been derived absolutely from them.

Those people, like ourselves, set out with a high opinion of this nobleman; and it is a point of importance to consider how they came to change it. If he would have been directed by their interested views, or would have preferred their convenience to the service of the state, he would have had their suffrages to this day. We ought, instead of adopting their unsair suggestions, to honour him for the causes of their distaste.

If lord Loudon would have left his foldiers without quarters, these people would

have been fatisfied: if he would have left ail means open to the intelligence of the enemy,

they would have made no complaints.

It is certain by the account of the people in the veffel taken by the Success, that they did not know the destination of our forces, and that great point, the division of their force, had been gained by it. This was a confequence of the embargo: and it was fuch as promised the most certain success to our enterprize, if the fleet from England had arrived at that time, to have joined in the execution. That fleet was delayed; and it appears by the intelligence obtained from the other prize, that, in the mean time, the French had encreased their seven ships to nine and twenty. That which was practicable against the smaller force, was impossible to be performed in opposition to the larger; and the attack of Louisbourg which might have been made at the first favourable time, was postponed by the delay of our fleet to a period when it was impracticable. I accuse no person: but this accident was the cause, and this single circumstance was the reason, we did not attack: Louisbourg at a time when probably we might have taken it.

In the mean while, the people of our collonies, disgusted at the high hand with which lord Loudon had necessarily carried the affair of quartering the troops and the embargo, sought

fought all occasions of misrepresenting his lordship's conduct: accidents in which he had no concern were in their consequences attributed to him, as if he had caused them; and every measure that falsehood, within the reach of their low cunning, could adopt, were used, to perplex and disturb his lordship's councils.

When they were tired with the novelty of the exercise of the soldiers, they began to complain that it was delaying business, and wasting useful time; though they at the same time knew the delay was the not arriving of the expected intelligence, and this was only an employment of the soldiers till it came.

They first bred those disaffections in the officers, of which they afterwards blamed the consequences; and they even attempted to set aside the evidence of that force in Louisbourg, which rendered the attack impracticable, by a falshood as insolent in the con-

trivance, as it was easy of detection.

The state of the place and strength of the enemy, on the knowledge of which the enterprize was suspended, were given by the French officers themselves, and intended for their sovereign. The account, on the strength of which they have endeavoured to invalidate it, was what they called the testimony of captain Goram. They were cunning to fix upon this name, for it had credit; and they were bold

to use it: they had no right to his name, when they annexed it to their scandalous section.

'Tis certain captain Goram was fent out a fecond time, and that he returned with a fecond account of the strength of the enemy. But what that account was, they never knew or heard: they gave out in the place of it, such an account as might best suit their own bad purposes; and they produced for this the authority of a Jew, who declared he had received it from captain Goram at midnight, or before day break, the day succeeding his arrival.

This story was their own, and they could give it whatever circumstances would best suit their purpose. They varied nothing from that state of the enemy's force, which set it at the lowest: the Jew declared the French had only sive ships of the line and two frigates; and that captain Goram gave him that account.

In the evening of the seventh of August, captain Goram came in from his expedition, and the Jew affirmed, that he had come on shore during the night; as it should seem to tell him this news, for there does not appear any other business that could bring him thither, and that having told him this he returned.

Added to the improbability of this ftory,

there was proved in it abfolute fallhood. It was not likely that captain Goram, when he had been fent on an enterprize of secrecy and importance, should come on shore to tell what he had seen to a poor Jew, before he gave an account of it to those who employed him; nor is it any more probable, that what he saw should contradict what the French officers themselves had just wrote home to their sovereign.

Captain Goram declared the whole an utter falfity. He affured all who asked him, that he never came on shore that night; non then or at any other time had spoke with

the lew upon that tubject.

This was a conviction there was no withftanding; the ftory was given up there, though it has been revived in England. The Jew was imprisoned as an impostor, but foon after discharged without punishment: the commander, whose reputation was intended to be hurt by this poor contrivance, being very much above fuch mean refentments. He confidered the fellow as he was, the tool of a fet of defigning men, whom as he would not have condescended to punish in their own persons, much less would he regard this milerable instrument of their baseness. What account captain Goram really brought can be no fecret; if lord Loudon be supposed a person interested in the 2

the event, it may be known from admiral Holbourn.

These are the proper sources of intelligence; and it is upon these and no other, we should found our good or bad opinion, our censure or applause of distinguished perfons. There is great merit in the action, when men of rank and affluence expose themfelves to the dangers and fatigues of war for the publick benefit; and we ought to look on those who do it with a high respect. No rank or influence should screen the guilty from infamy or punishment; but it becomes the publick to be very fure of facts before they form injurious suspicions. If it become a practice to indulge this difingenuous and indecent conduct of railing without cause, at all who do not succeed, we shall disgust those who are fit for high employments; and no man will undertake the fervice, but he who fets no value on his reputation.

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